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Abstract
Consider a policymaker who wants to decide which intervention to perform in order to
change a currently undesirable situation. The policymaker has at her disposal a team of
experts, each with their own understanding of the causal dependencies between different
factors contributing to the outcome. The policymaker has varying degrees of confidence
in the experts’ opinions. She wants to combine their opinions in order to decide on the
most effective intervention. We formally define the notion of an effective intervention,
and then consider how experts’ causal judgments can be combined in order to determine
the most effective intervention. We define a notion of two causal models being compatible,
and show how compatible causal models can be merged. We then use it as the basis for
combining experts’ causal judgments. We also provide definitions of partial compatibility
and causal model decomposition to cater for cases when models are incompatible. We
illustrate our approach on a number of real-life examples.
1. Introduction
Consider a policymaker who is trying to decide which intervention, that is, which
actions, should be implemented in order to bring about a desired outcome, such as
preventing violent behavior in prisons or reducing famine mortality in some country. The
policymaker has access to various experts who can advise her on which interventions to
consider. Some experts may be (in the policymaker’s view) more reliable than others;
they may also have different areas of expertise; or may have perceived alternative factors
in their analysis. The goal of the policymaker is to choose the best intervention, taking
into account the experts’ advice.
There has been a great deal of work on combining experts’ probabilistic judgments.
(Genest and Zidek [8] provide a somewhat dated but still useful overview; Dawid [5] and
Fenton et al. [6], among others, give a Bayesian analysis.) We are interested in combining
experts’ judgments in order to decide on the best intervention. Hence, we need more
than probabilities. We need to have a causal understanding of the situation. Thus, we
assume that the experts provide the policymaker with causal models. In general, these
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models may involve different variables (since the experts may be focusing on different
aspects of the problem). Even if two models both include variables C1 and C2, they may
disagree on the relationships between them. For example, one expert may believe that
C2 is independent of C1 while another may believe that C1 causally depends on C2. Yet
somehow the policymaker wants to use the information in these causal models to reach
her decision.
Despite the clear need for causal reasoning, and the examples in the literature and
in practice where experts work with causal models (e.g., [2, 24]), there is surprisingly
little work on combining causal judgments. Indeed, the only work that we are aware of
that preceded our work is that of Bradley, Dietrich, and List [1] (BDL from now on),
who prove an impossibility result. Specifically, they describe certain arguably reasonable
desiderata, and show that there is no way of merging causal models so as to satisfy all
their desiderata. They then discuss various weakenings of their assumptions to see the
extent to which the impossibility can be avoided, none of which seem that satisfactory.
Following the conference version of our paper, Zennaro and Ivanovska 2018 examined
the problem of merging causal models where the merged model must satisfy a fairness
requirement (although the individual experts’ models may not be fair). They proposed
a way of combining models based on ideas of BDL. Friedenberg and Halpern 2018 also
considered the same problem of combining causal model of experts, but allowed for
the possibility that experts disagree on the causal structure of variables due to having
different focus areas.
There is also much work on the closely related problem of causal discovery : construct-
ing a single causal model from a data set. A variety of techniques have been used to find
the model that best describes how the data is generated (see, e.g., [3, 4, 16, 26, 27];
Triantafillou and Tsamardinos [27] provide a good overview of work in the area).
Of course, if we have the data that the experts used to generate their models, then we
should apply the more refined techniques of the work on causal discovery. However, while
the causals model constructed by experts are presumably based on data, the data itself
is typically no longer available. Rather, the models represent the distillation of years of
experience, obtained by querying the experts.
In this paper, we present an approach to combining experts’ causal models when
sufficient data for discovering the overall causal model is not available. The key step in
combining experts’ causal models lies in defining when two causal models are compatible.
Causal models can be merged only if they are compatible. We start with a notion of
strong compatibility, where the conditions say, among other things, that if both M1 and
M2 involve variables C1 and C2, then they must agree on the causal relationship between
C1 and C2. But that is not enough. Suppose that in both models C1 depends on C2, C3,
and C4. Then in a precise sense, the two models must agree on how the dependence works,
despite describing the world using possibly different sets of variables. Roughly speaking,
this is the case when, for every variable C that the two models have in common, we can
designate one of the models as being “dominant” with respect to C, and use that model
to determine the relationships for C. When M1 and M2 are compatible, we are able to
construct a merged model M1⊕M2 that can be viewed as satisfying all but one of BDL’s
desiderata (and we argue that the one it does not satisfy is unreasonable).
In a precise sense, all conclusions that hold in either of the models M1 and M2 also
hold in the merged model (see Theorem 4.8(e) and Theorem 4.13(e)). In this way, the
merged model takes advantage of the information supplied by all the experts (at least, to
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the extent that the experts’ models are compatible), and can go beyond what we can do
with either of the individual models (e.g., considering interventions that simultaneously
act on variables that are in M1 but not in M2 and variables that are in M2 but not in
M1).
The set of constraints that need to be satisfied for models to be compatible is quite re-
strictive; as we show on real-life examples, models are often not compatible in this strong
sense. We thus define two successively more general notions of compatibility, and demon-
strate, by means of examples, how this allows for the merging a wider class of models,
and reasoning about interventions under less strict conditions. But even with these more
general notions, some experts’ models may still be incompatible due to disagreements
about some parts of the model, even though possible interventions to be considered do
not affect those parts of the model. We therefore introduce a notion of causal model de-
composition to allow policymakers to “localize” the incompatibility between models,and
merge the parts of the models that are compatible.
Having set out the formal foundation for merging causal models, we show how proba-
bilities can be assigned to different reasonable ways of combining experts’ causal models
based on the perceived reliability of the experts who proposed them, using relatively
standard techniques. The policymaker will then have a probability on causal models that
she can use to decide which interventions to implement. Specifically, we can use the
probability on causal models to compute the probability that an intervention is effica-
cious. Combining that with the cost of implementing the intervention, the policymaker
can compute the most effective intervention. As we shall see, although we work with
the same causal structures used to define causality, interventions are different from (and
actually simpler to analyze than) causes.
We draw on various examples from the literature (including real-world scenarios in-
volving complex sociological phenomena) to illustrate our approach, including crime-
prevention scenarios [24], radicalization in prisons [29], and child abuse [21].
These examples reinforce our belief that our approach provides a useful formal frame-
work that can be applied to the determination of appropriate interventions for policy-
making.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background
material on causal models. We formally define our notion of intervention and compare
it to causality in Section 3. We discuss our concept of compatibility and how causal
models can be merged in Section 4. We discuss how the notions of interventions and of
compatible models can be used by the policymakers to choose optimal interventions in
Section 5. Finally, we summarize our results and outline future directions in Section 6.
2. Causal Models
In this section, we review the definition of causal models introduced by Halpern and
Pearl [13]. The material in this section is largely taken from [11].
We assume that the world is described in terms of variables and their values. Some
variables may have a causal influence on others. This influence is modeled by a set of
structural equations. It is conceptually useful to split the variables into two sets: the
exogenous variables, whose values are determined by factors outside the model, and the
endogenous variables, whose values are ultimately determined by the exogenous variables.
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For example, in a voting scenario, we could have endogenous variables that describe what
the voters actually do (i.e., which candidate they vote for), exogenous variables that
describe the factors that determine how the voters vote, and a variable describing the
outcome (who wins). The structural equations describe how these values are determined
(majority rules; a candidate wins if A and at least two of B, C, D, and E vote for him;
etc.).
Formally, a causal model M is a pair (S,F), where S is a signature, which explicitly
lists the endogenous and exogenous variables and characterizes their possible values, and
F defines a set of (modifiable) structural equations, relating the values of the variables.
A signature S is a tuple (U ,V,R), where U is a set of exogenous variables, V is a set
of endogenous variables, and R associates with every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V a nonempty
set R(Y ) of possible values for Y (that is, the set of values over which Y ranges). For
simplicity, we assume here that V is finite, as is R(Y ) for every endogenous variable
Y ∈ V. F associates with each endogenous variable X ∈ V a function denoted FX
(i.e., FX = F(X)) such that FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y )) → R(X). This
mathematical notation just makes precise the fact that FX determines the value of X,
given the values of all the other variables in U ∪ V. If there is one exogenous variable U
and three endogenous variables, X, Y , and Z, then FX defines the values of X in terms
of the values of Y , Z, and U . For example, we might have FX(u, y, z) = u+ y, which is
usually written as X = U +Y . Thus, if Y = 3 and U = 2, then X = 5, regardless of how
Z is set.1
The structural equations define what happens in the presence of external interven-
tions. Setting the value of some variable X to x in a causal model M = (S,F) results in
a new causal model, denoted MX←x, which is identical to M , except that the equation
for X in F is replaced by X = x.
The dependencies between variables in a causal model M can be described using
a causal network (or causal graph), whose nodes are labeled by the endogenous and
exogenous variables in M = ((U ,V,R),F), with one node for each variable in U ∪ V.
The roots of the graph are (labeled by) the exogenous variables. There is a directed edge
from variable X to Y if Y depends on X; this is the case if there is some setting of all the
variables in U ∪ V other than X and Y such that varying the value of X in that setting
results in a variation in the value of Y ; that is, there is a setting ~z of the variables other
than X and Y and values x and x′ of X such that FY (x, ~z) 6= FY (x′, ~z). A causal model
M is recursive (or acyclic) if its causal graph is acyclic.2 It should be clear that if M
is an acyclic causal model, then given a context, that is, a setting ~u for the exogenous
variables in U , the values of all the other variables are determined (i.e., there is a unique
solution to all the equations). We can determine these values by starting at the top of
the graph and working our way down. In this paper, following the literature, we restrict
to acyclic models.
The following example, due to Lewis [19], describes a simple causal scenario.
1The fact that X is assigned U + Y (i.e., the value of X is the sum of the values of U and Y ) does
not imply that Y is assigned X − U ; that is, FY (U,X,Z) = X − U does not necessarily hold.
2Halpern 2016 calls this strongly recursive, and takes a recursive model to be one where, for each
context ~u, the dependency graph is acyclic (but it may be a different acyclic graph for context, so that
in one context A may be an ancestor of B, while in another, B may be an ancestor of A).
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Example 2.1. Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy’s rock
gets there first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s
would have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy’s throw. Consider
a model having an exogenous variable U that encapsulates whatever background factors
cause Suzy and Billy to decide to throw the rock (the details of U do not matter, since we
are interested only in the context where U ’s value is such that both Suzy and Billy throw).
Thus, U has four possible values, depending on which of Suzy and Billy throw. We also
have three binary variables: ST for Suzy throws, BT for Billy throws, and BS for bottle
shatters. ST = 1 means “Suzy throws”; ST = 0 means that she does not. We interpret
BT = 1, BT = 0, BS = 1, and BS = 0 similarly. The values of ST and BT are determined
by the context. The value of BS is determined by the equation FBS (~u,ST,BT) = ST∨BT.
The causal graph corresponding to this model is depicted in Figure 1.3
BS
ST BT
U
Figure 1: The causal graph for the rock-throwing example.
In many papers in the literature (e.g., [1, 24]) a causal model is defined simply by a
causal graph indicating the dependencies, perhaps with an indication of whether a change
has a positive or negative effect; that is, edges are annotated with + or −, so that an edge
from A to B annotated with + means that an increase in A results in an increase in B,
while if it is annotated with a −, then an increase in A results in a decrease in B (where
what constitutes an increase or decrease is determined by the model). Examples of these
are shown in Section 4. Our models are more expressive, since the equations typically
provide much more detailed information regarding the dependence between variables
(as shown in Example 2.1); the causal graphs capture only part of this information.
Of course, this extra information makes merging models more difficult (although, as
the results of BDL show, the difficulties in merging models already arise with purely
qualitative graphs).
To define interventions carefully, it is useful to have a language in which we can make
statements about interventions. Given a signature S = (U ,V,R), a primitive event is a
formula of the form X = x, for X ∈ V and x ∈ R(X). A causal formula (over S) is
one of the form [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ, where ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive
events, Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct variables in U ∪ V, and yi ∈ R(Yi).4 Such a formula is
3We could also model this problem using time-indexed variables that explicitly model the temporal
order of events; see [11, 13]. The issues raised by this example could be made using either approach.
4In earlier work [11, 13], each Yi was taken to be an endogenous variable. For technical reasons
(explained in Section 4), we also allow Y to be exogenous.
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abbreviated as [~Y ← ~y]ϕ. The special case where k = 0 is abbreviated as ϕ. Intuitively,
[Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ says that ϕ would hold if Yi were set to yi, for i = 1, . . . , k.
We call a pair (M,~u) consisting of a causal model M and a context ~u a (causal)
setting. A causal formula ψ is true or false in a setting. We write (M,~u) |= ψ if the
causal formula ψ is true in the setting (M,~u). The |= relation is defined inductively.
(M,~u) |= X = x if the variable X has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with
acyclic models) solution to the equations in M in context ~u (that is, the unique vector of
values for the exogenous variables that simultaneously satisfies all equations in M with
the variables in U set to ~u). If k ≥ 1 and Yk is an endogenous variable, then
(M,~u) |= [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ iff
(MYk←yk , ~u) |= [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk−1 ← yk−1]ϕ.
If Yk is an exogenous variable, then
(M,~u) |= [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ iff
(M,~u[Yk/yk]) |= [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk−1 ← yk−1]ϕ,
where ~u[Yk/yk] is the result of replacing the value of Yk in ~u by yk.
3. Interventions
In this section, we define (causal) interventions, and compare the notion of interven-
tion to that of cause.
Definition 3.1. [Intervention] ~X = ~x is an intervention leading to ¬ϕ in (M,~u) if the
following three conditions hold:
I1. (M,~u) |= ϕ.
I2. (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x]¬ϕ.
I3. ~X is minimal; there is no strict subset ~X ′ of ~X and values ~x′ such that ~X ′ = ~x′
satisfies I2.
I1 says ϕ must be true in the current setting (M,~u), while I2 says that performing
the intervention results in ϕ no longer being true. I3 is a minimality condition. From a
policymaker’s perspective, I2 is the key condition. It says that by making the appropriate
changes, we can bring about a change in ϕ.
Our definition of an intervention leading to ¬ϕ slightly generalizes others in the
literature. Pearl [23] assumes that the causal model is first analyzed, and then a new
intervention variable IV is added for each variable V on which we want to intervene. If
IV = 1, then the appropriate intervention on V takes place, independent of the values
of the other parents of V ; if IV = 0, then IV has no effect, and the behavior of V is
determined by its parents, just as it was in the original model. Lu and Druzdzel [20],
Korb et al. [18], and Woodward [30] take similar approaches.
We do not require special intervention variables; we just allow interventions directly
on the variables in the model. But we can certainly assume as a special case that for each
variable V in the model there is a special intervention variable IV that works just like
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Pearl’s intervention variables, and thus recover the other approaches considered in the
literature. Our definition also focuses on the outcome of the intervention, not just the
intervention itself. In any case, it should be clear that all these definitions are trying to
capture exactly the same intuitions, and differ only in minor ways.
Although there seems to be relatively little disagreement about how to capture in-
tervention, the same cannot be said for causality. Even among definitions that involve
counterfactuals and structural equations [9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 30], there are a number of
subtle variations. Fortunately for us, the definition of intervention does not depend on
how causality is defined. While we do not get into the details of causality here, it is
instructive to compare the definitions of causality and intervention.
For definiteness, we focus on the definition of causality given by Halpern [10]. It has
conditions AC1–3 that are analogous of I1–3. Specifically, AC1 says ~X = ~x is a cause
of ϕ in (M,~u) if (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) ∧ ϕ and AC3 is a minimality condition. AC2 is a
more complicated condition; it says that there exist values ~x′ for the variables in ~X, a
(possibly empty) subset ~W of variables, and values ~w for the variables in ~W such that
(M,~u) |= ~W = ~w and (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ. We do not attempt to explain or
motivate AC2 here, since our focus is not causality.
Consider Example 2.1 again. Changing the value of Suzy’s throw by itself is not an
intervention leading to the bottle not being shattered. Even if we prevent Suzy from
throwing, the bottle will still shatter because of Billy’s throw. That is, although ST = 1
is a cause of the bottle shattering, ST = 0 is not an intervention leading to the bottle
not being shattered; intervening on ST alone does not change the outcome. On the other
hand, ST = 0 ∧ BT = 0 is an intervention leading to the bottle not being shattered,
but ST = 1 ∧ BT = 1 is not a cause of the bottle shattering; it violates the minimality
condition AC3.
It is almost immediate from the definitions that we have the following relationship
between interventions and causes:
Proposition 3.2. If ~X = ~x is an intervention leading to ¬ϕ in (M,~u), then there is
some subset ~X ′ of ~X such that ~X ′ = ~x′ is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u), where ~x′ is such that
(M,~u) |= ~X ′ = ~x′. Conversely, if ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) then there is a superset
~X ′ of ~X and values ~x′ such that ~X ′ = ~x′ is an intervention leading to ¬ϕ.
Halpern [10] proved that (for his latest definition) the complexity of determining
whether ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) is DP -complete, where DP consists of those
languages L for which there exist a language L1 in NP and a language L2 in co-NP
such that L = L1 ∩ L2 [22]. It is well known that DP is at least as hard as NP and
co-NP (and most likely strictly harder). The following theorem shows that the problem
of determining whether ~X = ~x is an intervention is in a lower complexity class.
Theorem 3.3. Given a causal model M , a context ~u, and a Boolean formula ϕ, the
problem of determining whether ~X = ~x is an intervention leading to ¬ϕ in (M,~u) is
co-NP-complete.
Proof. First, we prove membership in co-NP. It is easy to see that checking conditions
I1 and I2 of Definition 3.1 can be done in polynomial time by simply evaluating ϕ first
in (M,~u) and then in the modified context where the values of ~X are set to ~x. Checking
whether I3 holds is in co-NP, because the complementary condition is in NP; indeed, we
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simply have to guess a subset ~X ′ of ~X and values ~x′ and verify that I1 and I2 hold for
~X ′ = ~x′ and ϕ, which, as we observed, can be done in polynomial time.
For co-NP-hardness, we provide a reduction from UNSAT, which is the language of
all unsatisfiable Boolean formulas, to the intervention problem. Given a formula ψ that
mentions the set ~V of variables, we construct a causal model Mψ, context ~u, and formula
ϕ such that ~V = 1 is an intervention 5joe42 leading to ¬ϕ in (M,~u) iff ψ is unsatisfiable.
The set of endogenous variables inM is ~V ∪{V ′, Y }, where V ′ and Y are fresh variables
not in ~V . Let ~W = ~V ∪{V ′}. There is a single exogenous variable U that determines the
value of the variables in ~W : we have the equation V = U for each variable V ∈ ~W . The
equation for Y is Y = ∨V ∈ ~W (V = 0) (so Y = 1 if at least one variable in ~W is 0). Let
ϕ be ¬ψ ∧ (Y = 1). We claim that ~W = ~1 is an intervention leading to ¬ϕ in (Mψ, 0) iff
ψ ∈ UNSAT.
Suppose that ψ ∈ UNSAT. Then, it is easy to see that (M, 0) |= ϕ (since ¬ψ is
valid) and (M, 0) |= [ ~W ← ~1]¬ϕ (since (M, 0) |= [ ~W ← ~1](Y = 0)). To see that I3
holds, suppose by way of contradiction that ~W ′ ← ~w′ satisfies I1 and I2 for some strict
subset ~W ′ of ~W . In particular, we must have (M, 0) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w′]¬ϕ. We clearly have
(M, 0) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w′](Y = 1), so we must have (M, 0) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w′]ψ, contradicting the
assumption that ψ ∈ UNSAT. Thus, ~W ← ~1 is an intervention leading to ¬ϕ, as desired.
For the converse, suppose that ~W ← ~1 is an intervention leading to ¬ϕ. Then we
must have (M, 0) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w′]¬ψ for all strict subsets ~W ′ of ~W and all settings ~w′ of
the variables in ~W ′. Since, in particular, this is true for all subsets ~W ′ of ~W that do not
involve V ′, it follows that ¬ψ is true for all truth assignments, so ψ ∈ UNSAT.
In practice, however, we rarely expect to face the co-NP complexity. For reasons of
cost or practicality, we would expect a policymaker to consider interventions on at most
k variables, for some small k. The straightforward algorithm that, for a given k, checks
all sets of variables of the model M of size at most k runs in time O(|M |k).
4. Merging Compatible Causal Models
This section presents our definition for compatibility of expert opinions. We consider
each expert’s opinion to be represented by a causal model and, for simplicity, that each
expert expresses her opinion with certainty. (We can easily extend our approach to allow
the experts to have some uncertainty about the correct model; see the end of Section 5.)
We start with a strong notion of compatibility, and then consider generalizations of this
notion that are more widely applicable.
4.1. Full compatibility
To specify what it means for a set of models to be compatible, we first define what it
means for the causal model M1 to contain at least as much information about variable
C as the causal model M2, denoted M1 C M2. Intuitively, M1 contains at least as
much information about C as M2 if M1 and M2 say the same things about the causal
structure of C as far as the variables that M1 and M2 share, but M1 contains (possibly)
more information about C, because, for example, there are additional variables in M1
that affect C. We capture this property formally below. We say that B is an immediate
M2-ancestor of Y in M1 if B ∈ U2 ∪V2, B is an ancestor of Y in M1, and there is a path
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from B to Y in M1 that has no nodes in U2 ∪ V2 other than B and Y (if Y ∈ U2 ∪ V2).
That is, Y is the first node in M2 after B on a path from B to Y in M1.
Definition 4.1. [Strong domination] Let M1 = ((U1,V1,R1),F1) and M2 = ((U2, V2,
R2),F2). Let ParM (C) denote the variables that are parents of C in M . M1 strongly
dominates M2 with respect to C, denoted M1 C M2, if the following conditions hold:
MI1M1,M2,C . The parents of C in M2, ParM2(C), are the immediate M2-ancestors of
C in M1.
MI2M1,M2,C . Every path from an exogenous variable to C in M1 goes through a variable
in ParM2(C).
MI3M1,M2,C . Let X = ((U1 ∪ V1) ∩ (U2 ∪ V2)) − {C}. Then for all settings ~x of the
variables in ~X, all values c of C, all contexts ~u1 for M1, and all contexts ~u2 for
M2, we have
(M1, ~u1) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c) iff (M2, ~u2) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c).
If MI1M1,M2,C holds and, for example, B is a parent of C in M2, then there may be
a variable B′ on the path from B to C in M1. Thus, M1 has in a sense more detailed
information than M2 about the causal paths leading to C. MI1M1,M2,C is not by itself
enough to say that M1 and M2 agree on the causal relations for C. This is guaranteed by
MI2M1,M2,C and MI3M1,M2,C . MI2M1,M2,C says that the variables in ParM2(C) screen
off C from the exogenous variables in M1. (Clearly the variables in ParM2(C) also screen
off C from the exogenous variables in M2.) It follows that if (M1, ~u1) |= [ParM2(C) ←
~x](C = c) for some context ~u1, then (M1, ~u) |= [ParM2(C) ← ~x](C = c) for all contexts
~u in M1, and similarly for M2. In light of this observation, it follows that MI3M1,M2,C
assures us that C satisfies the same causal relations in both models. We write M1 6C M2
if any of the conditions above does not hold.
Two technical comments regarding Definition 4.1: First, note that in MI3 we used
the fact that we allow the ~X in formulas of the form [ ~X ← ~x]ϕ to include exogenous
variables, since some of the parents of C may be exogenous. Second, despite the suggestive
notation, C is not a partial order. In particular, it is not hard to construct examples
showing that it is not transitive. However, C is a partial order on compatible models
(see the proof of Proposition 4.8), which is the only context in which we are interested
in transitivity, so the abuse of notation is somewhat justified.
Note that we have a relation C for each variable C that appears in both M1 and M2.
Model M1 may be more informative than M2 with respect to C whereas M2 may be more
informative than M1 with respect to another variable C
′. Roughly speaking, M1 and M2
are fully compatible if for each variable C ∈ V1 ∩ V2, either M1 C M2 or M2 C M1.
We then merge M1 and M2 by taking the equations for C to be determined by the model
that has more information about C. Consider another example demonstrating the notion
of strong dominance, taken from [1].
Example 4.2. [1] An aid agency consults two experts about causes of famine in a region.
Both experts agree that the amount of rainfall (R) affects crop yield (Y ). Specifically, a
shortage of rainfall leads to poor crop yield. Expert 2 says that political conflict (P ) can
also directly affect famine. Expert 1, on the other hand, says that P affects F only via
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Y . The experts’ causal graphs are depicted in Figure 2, where the graph on the left, M1,
describes expert 1’s model, while the graph on the right, M2, describes expert 2’s model.
These graphs already appear in the work of BDL. In these graphs (as in many other
causal graphs in the literature), the exogenous variables are omitted; all the variables
are taken to be endogenous. Neither MI1M1,M2,F nor MI1M2,M1,F holds, since P is not
R
P
Y
F
M1
R
P
Y
F
M2Figure 2: Two expert’s models of famine.
an M2-immediate ancestor of F in M1. Similarly, neither MI1M1,M2,Y nor MI1M2,M1,Y
holds, since P is not an M1-immediate ancestor of Y in M2 (indeed, it is not an ancestor
at all). MI2M1,M2,F holds since every path in M1 from an exogenous variable to F goes
through a variable that is a parent of F in M2 (namely, Y ); MI2M2,M1,F does not hold
(there is a path in M2 to F via P that does not go through a parent of F in M1).
Although we are not given the equations, we also know that MI3M1,M2,F does not hold.
Since P is a parent of F in M2 according to expert 2, there must be a setting y of Y such
that the value of F changes depending on the value of P if Y = y. This cannot be the
case in M1, since Y screens off P from F . It easily follows that taking ~X = (P, Y ) we get
a counterexample to MI3M1,M2,F . Therefore, we have neither M1 F M2 nor M2 F M1.
While the definition of dominance given above is useful, it does not cover all cases
where a policymaker may want to merge models. Consider the following example, taken
from the work of Sampson et al. [24].
Example 4.3. Two experts have provided causal models regarding the causes of domes-
tic violence. According to the first expert, an appropriate arrest policy (AP) may affect
both an offender’s belief that his partner would report any abuse to police (PLS) and
the amount of domestic violence (DV). The amount of domestic violence also affects the
likelihood of a victim calling to report abuse (C), which in turn affects the likelihood of
there being a random arrest (A). (Decisions on whether to arrest the offender in cases of
domestic violence were randomized.)
According to the second expert, DV affects A directly, while A affects the amount
of repeated violence (RV) through both formal sanction (FS) and informal sanction on
socially embedded individuals (IS). Sampson et al. [24] use the causal graphs shown in
Figure 3, which are annotated with the direction of the influence (the only information
provided by the experts) to describe the expert’s opinions.
For the two common variables DV and A, MI1M1,M2,DV and MI1M1,M2,A both hold. If
the only variables that have exogenous parents are AP in M1 and DV in M2, and the set
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Figure 3: Experts’ models of domestic violence.
of parents of AP in M1 is a subset of the set of parents of DV in M2, then MI2M1,M2,DV
holds. Sampson et al. seem to be implicitly assuming this, and that MI3 holds, so they
merge M1 and M2 to get the causal graph shown in Figure 4.
−
−
PLS
−
DV
+
−
+
C A
FS
IS
+
+
−
−
RV
Figure 4: The result of merging experts’ model of domestic violence.
Sampson et al. do not provide structural equations. Moreover, for edges that do not
have a + or − annotation, such as the edge from DV to A in Figure 3, we do not even
know qualitatively what the impact of interventions is. Presumably, the lack of annotation
represents the expert’s uncertainty. We can capture this uncertainty by viewing the expert
as having a probability on two models that disagree on the direction of DV’s influence
on A (and thus are incompatible because they disagree on the equations). We discuss in
Section 5 how such uncertainty can be handled.
Suppose that some parent of AP (or AP itself) in M1 is not a parent of DV in M2.
Then, in M1, it may be possible to change the value of DV by intervening on AP, while
keeping the values of all the exogenous variables that are parents of DV in M2 fixed.
This will seem like an inexplicable change in the value of DV from the perspective of the
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second expert. If the second expert had been aware of such possible changes, she surely
would have added additional variables to M2 to capture this situation. One explanation
of the fact that no changes were observed is that the second expert was working in a
setting where the values of all variables that she cannot affect by an intervention are
determined by some default setting of exogenous variables of which she is not aware (or
not modeling).
Given models M1 and M2, we now want to define a notion of weak domination relative
to a default setting ~v∗ of the exogenous variables in U1 ∪U2. We say that contexts ~u1 for
M1 and ~u2 for M2 are compatible with ~v
∗ if ~u1 and ~u2 agree on the variables in U1 ∩ U2,
~u1 agrees with ~v
∗ on the variables in U1 − U2, and ~u2 agrees with ~v∗ on the variables in
U2 − U1.
Definition 4.4. [Domination relative to a default setting] Let ~v∗ be a default setting for
the variables in M1 and M2. M1 dominates M2 with respect to C relative to ~v
∗, denoted
M1 ~v∗C M2, if MI1M1,M2,C holds, and, in addition, the following condition (which can
be viewed as a replacement for MI2M1,M2,C and MI3M1,M2,C) holds:
MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ Let
~X = (U1 ∪ V1) ∩ (U2 ∪ V2) − {C}. Then for all settings ~x of the
variables in ~X, all values c of C, and all contexts ~u1 for M1 and ~u2 for M2 that
are compatible with ~v∗, we have
(M1, ~u1) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c) iff (M2, ~u2) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c).
It is easy to see that C is a special case of ~v∗C :
Lemma 4.5. If M1 C M2, then, for all default settings ~v∗ of the variables in M1 and
M2, we have M1 ~v∗C M2.
Proof. Suppose that M1 C M2. Fix default values ~v∗. Clearly MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ is a
special case of MI2. Thus, M1 ~v∗C M2.
In light of Lemma 4.5, we give all the definitions in the remainder of the paper using
~v∗C . All the technical results hold if we replace ~v
∗
C by C throughout.
Definition 4.6. [Full compatibility of causal models] If M1 = ((U1,V1,R1),F1) and
M2 = ((U2,V2, R2),F2), then M1 and M2 are fully compatible with respect to default
setting ~v∗ if (1) for all variables C ∈ (U1 ∪ V1) ∩ (U2 ∪ V2), we have R1(C) = R2(C)
and (2) for all variables C ∈ (V1 ∩ V2) ∪ (V1 ∩ U2) ∪ (V2 ∩ U1), either M1 ~v∗C M2 or
M2 ~v∗C M1. We say that M1 and M2 are fully compatible if U1 = U2 (so we can ignore
the default setting).
Definition 4.7. [Merging fully compatible models] If M1 = ((U1,V1,R1),F1) and M2 =
((U2,V2,R2),F2) are fully compatible with respect to ~v∗, then the merged model M1⊕~v∗M2
is the causal model ((U ,V,R),F), where
• U = U1 ∪ U2 − (V1 ∪ V2);
• V = V1 ∪ V2;
• if C ∈ U1 ∪ V1, then R(C) = R1(C), and if C ∈ U2 ∪ V2, then R(C) = R2(C);
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• if C ∈ V1 − V2 or if both C ∈ V1 ∩ V2 and M1 ~v∗C M2, then F(C) = F1(C); if
C ∈ V2 − V1 or if both C ∈ V1 ∩ V2 and M2 ~v∗C M1, then F(C) = F2(C).5
We write M1 ⊕M2 if U1 = U2.
Note that we assume that when experts use the same variable, they are referring to
the same phenomenon within the same domain. Our approach does not deal with the
possibility of two experts using the same variable name to refer to different phenomenon.
Returning to Example 4.3, assume that either MI2M1,M2,DV , MI2M1,M2,A, MI3M1,M2,DV ,
and MI3M1,M2,A all hold, or there is a default setting ~v
∗ such that Then M1 ⊕M2 has
the causal graph described in Figure 4; that is, even though Sampson et al. [24] do not
have a formal theory for merging models, they actually merge models in just the way
that we are suggesting.
Let M1 ∼~v∗C M2 be an abbreviation for M1 ~v
∗
C M2 and M2 ~v
∗
C M1. We also write
M1 ~v∗C M2 if M1 ~v
∗
C M2 and M2 6~v
∗
C M1.
The next theorem provides evidence that Definition 4.6 is reasonable and captures
our intuitions. Part (b) says that it is well defined, so that in the clauses in the definition
where there might be potential conflict, such as in the definition of F(C) when C ∈ V1∩V2
and M1 ∼~v∗C M2, there is in fact no conflict; part (a) is a technical result needed to prove
part (b). Part (c) says that the merged model is guaranteed to be acyclic. Part (d) says
that causal paths in M1 are preserved in M1 ⊕~v∗M2, while part (e) says that at least as
far as formulas involving the variables in M1 go, M1⊕~v∗M2 and M1 agree, provided that
the default values are used for the exogenous variables not in U1 ∩ U2. Parts (d) and (e)
can be viewed as saying that the essential causal structure of M1 and M2 is preserved
in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. All conclusions that can be drawn in M1 and M2 individually can be
drawn in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. (In the language of Halpern [12], part (e) says that M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 is
essentially a conservative extension of M1.) But it is important to note that M1⊕~v∗M2
lets us go beyond M1 and M2, since we can, for example, consider interventions that
simultaneously affect variables in M1 that are not in M2 and variables in M2 that are
not in M1. Finally, parts (f) and (g) say that ⊕~v∗ is commutative and associative over
its domain.
Theorem 4.8. Suppose that M1 M2, and M3 are pairwise fully compatible with respect
to default setting ~v∗. Then the following conditions hold.
(a) If M1 ∼~v∗C M2 then (i) ParM1(C) = ParM2(C) and (ii) F1(C) = F2(C);
(b) M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 is well defined.
(c) M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 is acyclic.
(d) If A and B are variables in M1, then A is an ancestor of B in M1 iff A is an
ancestor of B in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2.
(e) If ϕ is a formula that mentions only the endogenous variables in M1, ~u is a context
for M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, ~u1 is a context for M1, and ~u and ~u1 are compatible with ~v∗, then
(M1, ~u1) |= ϕ iff (M1 ⊕M2, ~u) |= ϕ.
5We are abusing notation here and viewing Fi(C) as a function from the values of the parents of C
in Mi to the value of C, as opposed to a function from all the values of all variables other than C to the
value of C.
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(f) M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 = M2 ⊕~v∗ M1.
(g) If M3 is fully compatible with M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 with respect to ~v∗ and M1 is fully
compatible with M2 ⊕~v∗ M3 with respect to ~v∗, then M1 ⊕~v∗ (M2 ⊕~v∗ M3) =
(M1 ⊕~v∗ M2)⊕~v∗ M3.
The proof of Theorem 4.8 is rather involved; the details can be found in Appendix
A.
We define what it means for a collection M = {M1, . . . ,Mn} of causal models to be
mutually compatible with respect to default setting ~v∗ (for all the exogenous variables that
are not common to M1, . . . ,Mn) by induction on the cardinality ofM. If |M| = 1, then
mutual compatibility trivially holds. If |M| = 2, then the models in M are mutually
compatible with respect to ~v∗ if they are fully compatible with respect to ~v∗ according to
Definition 4.6. If |M| = n, then the models in M are mutually compatible with respect
to ~v∗ if the models in every subset of M of cardinality n − 1 are mutually compatible
with respect to ~v∗, and for each model M ∈ M, M is fully compatible with ⊕~v∗M ′ 6=MM ′
with respect to ~v∗. By Theorem 4.8, if M1, . . . ,Mn are mutually compatible with respect
to ~v∗, then the causal model M1⊕~v∗ · · · ⊕~v∗Mn is well defined; we do not have to worry
about parenthesization, nor the order in which the settings are combined. Thus, the
model ⊕~v∗M ′ 6=MM ′ considered in the definition is also well defined. Theorem 4.8(e) also
tells us that M1⊕~v∗ · · ·⊕~v∗Mn contains, in a precise sense, at least as much information
as each model Mi individually. Thus, by merging mutually compatible models, we are
maximizing our use of information.
This approach to merging models is our main contribution. Using it, we show in
Section 5 how experts’ models can be combined to reason about interventions.
We now discuss the extent to which our approach to merging models M1 and M2
satisfies BDL’s desiderata. Recall that BDL considered only causal networks, not causal
models in our sense; they also assume that all models mention the same set of variables.
They consider four desiderata. We briefly describe them and their status in our setting.
Since BDL do not consider contexts explicity, we assume for simplicity in this discussion
that the context is the same for all models, and talk only about ⊕ rather than ⊕~v∗ .
• Universal Domain: the rule for combining models accepts all possible inputs and
can output any logically possible model. This clearly holds for us.
• Acyclicity : the result of merging M1 and M2 is acyclic. This follows from Theo-
rem 4.8(c), provided that M1 ⊕M2 is defined.
• Unbiasedness: if M1 ⊕M2 is defined, and M1 and M2 mention the same variables,
then whether B is a parent of C in M1⊕M2 depends only on whether B is a parent
of C in M1 and in M2. This property holds trivially for us, since if B and C are in
both M1 and M2 and M1 ⊕M2 is defined, then B is a parent of C in M1 ⊕M2 iff
B is a parent of C in both M1 and M2. (The version of this requirement given by
BDL does not say “if M1⊕M2 is defined”, since they assume that arbitrary models
can be merged.) BDL also have a neutrality requirement as part of unbiasedness.
Unfortunately, an aggregation rule that says that B is a parent of C in M1 ⊕M2
iff B is a parent of C in both M1 and M2 (which seems quite reasonable to us)
is not neutral in their sense, so we do not satisfy neutrality (nor, in light of the
observation above, do we consider it a reasonble requirement to satisfy).
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• Non-dictatorship: no single expert determines the aggregation. This clearly holds
for us.
We conclude this section with a characterization of the complexity of determining
whether two causal models are fully compatible. Determining whether M1 and M2 are
fully compatible requires checking whether the conditions of Definition 4.6 hold. This
amounts to checking the conditions MI1M1,M2,C and MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ for all variables C ∈
(U1 ∪ V1) ∩ (U2 ∪ V2).
How hard this is to do depends in part on how the models are presented. If the
models are presented explicitly, which means that, for each variable C, the equation for
C is described as a (huge) table, giving the value of C for each possible setting of all the
other variables, the problem is polynomial in the sizes of the input models. However, the
size of the model will be exponential in the number of variables.
In this case, checking whether MI1M1,M2,C holds for all C amounts to checking
whether the parents of C in M2 are the immediate M2-ancestors of C in M1. To solve
this, we need to determine, for each pair of endogenous variables X and Y in Mi for
i = 1, 2, whether X depends on Y . With this information, we can construct the causal
graphs for M1 and M2, and then quickly determine whether MI1M1,M2,C holds.
If the model is given explicitly, then determining wheter X depends on Y amounts
to finding two rows in the table of values of FX that differ only in the value of Y and
in the outcome. As the number of pairs of rows is quadratic in the size of the table, this
is polynomial in the size of the input. Thus, we can determine if MI1M1,M2,C holds in
polynomial time.
Checking if MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ holds amounts to checking whether
(M1, ~u1) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c),
iff
(M2, ~u2) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c).
For a specific setting ~u and choice of ~X and ~x, we can easily compute the value of C in
a context ~u if ~X is set to ~x (even if the model is not given explicitly). Since the number
of possible settings is smaller than the size of an explicitly presented model, we can also
determine whether MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ holds in polynomial time if the model is presented
explicitly.
On the other hand, if the models are presented in a more compact way, with the
structural equations, and hence the (descriptions of the) models, being of size polyno-
mial in the number of variables in the model, checking full compatibility is in a higher
complexity class, as we now show.
Proposition 4.9. Given two causal models M1 and M2 of size polynomial in the number
of variables, determining whether they are fully compatible with respect to a default setting
~v∗ is in PNP|| and is co-NP-hard in the sizes of M1 and M2.
Proof. We prove a slightly stronger claim: that checking MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ is co-NP-complete
in the sizes of M1 and M2, and that checking MI1M1,M2,C is in P
NP
|| . The complexity
class PNP|| consists of all decision problems that can be solved in polynomial time with
parallel (i.e., non-adaptive) queries to an NP oracle (see [? ? ? ]).
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We start by showing that checking that MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ holds is in co-NP by showing
that the complementary problem, namely demonstrating that MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ does not
hold, is in NP. To do this, we guess a witness: a setting ~x for the common variables ~X
of M1 and M2 other than C, a value c of C, and contexts ~u1 and ~u2 for M1 and M2,
respectively, such that ~u1 and ~u2 are compatible with ~v
∗,
(M1, ~u1) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c),
but
(M2, ~u2) 6|= [ ~X ← ~x](C 6= c)
(or vice versa). A witness can be verified in polynomial time in the size of the model, as
it amounts to assigning values to all variables in the models and checking the value of C.
The proof that the problem is co-NP hard is by reduction from the known co-NP-
complete problem Tautology : determining whether a Boolean formula ϕ is a tautology.
Let ϕ be a Boolean formula over the variables {Y1, . . . , Yn}. We construct a causal model
M1 as follows:
1. U1 = {U1, . . . , Un};
2. V1 = {Y1, . . . , Yn, C};
3. R1(X) = {0, 1} for all X ∈ V1;
4. the equations are Yi = Ui for i = 1, . . . , n and C = ϕ.
We note that since the set of exogenous variables is the same in M1 and in M2, we don’t
need to define the default setting ~v∗. In other words, the variables {Y1, . . . , Yn} are binary
variables in M1, and the value of C is determined by ϕ.
The second causal model M2 is constructed as follows:
1. U2 = {U1, . . . , Un};
2. V2 = {Y1, . . . , Yn, C};
3. R2(X) = {0, 1} for all X ∈ V2;
4. the equations are Yi = Ui for i = 1, . . . , n, and C = 1.
MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ holds iff ϕ is a tautology. Indeed, if ϕ is a tautology, then MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗
holds trivially. On the other hand, if ϕ is not a tautology, then it is easy to see that
MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ does not hold, since there is some setting of the variables Y1, . . . , Yn that
makes C = 0.
To prove membership of MI1M1,M2,C in P
NP
|| , we describe a polynomial-time algorithm
for deciding MI1M1,M2,C that makes parallel queries to an NP oracle. We define an oracle
ODep(M,X, Y ) as follows: for a causal model M and two variables X and Y of M , it
answers “yes” if FX depends on the variable Y in M and “no” otherwise. It is easy to
see that ODep(M,X, Y ) is in NP, since a witness for the positive answer is a pair of
assignments to the variables of FX that differ only in the value of Y and in the result.
A witness is clearly verifiable in polynomial time; we simply instantiate FX on these
two assignments and verify that the results are different. (We have implicitly assumed
here that the equation FX can be computed in polynomial time, as it is a part of M .)
By querying the oracle ODep(Mi, X, Y ) for all endogenous variables X and Y in Mi, for
i = 1, 2, we can determine the causal graphs of M1 and M2, and thus whether MI1M1,M2,C
holds. The number of queries is at most quadratic in the sizes of M1 and M2, hence the
algorithm terminates in polynomial time.
16
4.2. Partial compatibility
While the notion of dominance used in Definition 4.6 is useful, it still does not cover
many cases of interest. We briefly describe an example here on causal models for the
emergence of radicalization in US prisons. The material is taken from Useem and Clayton
[28]. Although Useem and Clayton do not provide causal models, we construct these based
on the description provided. We do not provide a detailed explanation of all the variables
and their dependencies here (details are provided in the full paper); for our purposes, it
suffices to focus on the structure of these models.
Example 4.10. Consider the two causal models in Figure 5. M1 represents expert 1’s
opinion about emerging radicalization (R) in the State Correctional Institution Camp
Hill in Pennsylvania. M2 represents expert 2’s opinion about the causes of emergence
in the Texas Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Both experts agree on the
structural equations for R. However they differ on the structural equations for PD, CB
and AM. The authors point to three main factors upon which the emergence of rad-
icalization settings in both prison settings is dependent: “order in prisons” (PD), “a
boundary between the prison and potentially radicalizing communities” (CB), and “hav-
ing missionary leadership within the prison organizations” (AM). The also both share
the same outcome —emerging radicalization (R). As can be observed from the descrip-
tions provided, some variables and their dependency relations are specific to a prison.
In M1, PD is attributed to corruption (CG) and lax management (LM) in the prison’s
staff together with prisons being allowed to roam freely (FM). CB is viewed as a result of
religious leaders within the facilities being permitted to provide religious services freely
(IL) and by prisoners showing membership within a prison community (CM) which in
turn is signalled by prisoners being allowed to wear distinguished street clothing (SC).
Prison authorities’ exercising of internal punishments, such as administrative segregation
(AS), away from external oversight, and IL are considered to directly contribute to AM.
M2 instead considers PD to be linked to the rapid growth in inmate numbers (RG), in-
mates being allowed to assist authorities in maintaining order (AA), and inmates feeling
significantly deprived (D) within the prisons—the latter as a result of being forced to en-
gage in unpaid work (W) and having limited contact with visitors (C). For the common
variables CB and AM, assuming default values for CG, LM and FM in SCICH and for
AA, D and RG in M2, we can show that M1 ~v∗CB M2 and M1 ~v
∗
AM M2. However, neither
model dominates the other with respect to PD; neither MI1M1,M2,PD nor MI1M2,M1,PD
holds. Therefore the models are not fully compatible according to Definition 4.6.
Although the models are not fully compatible according to our definition, the in-
compatibility is “localized” to the variable PD, a point we make precise in Section 4.3.
Moreover, it is not even clear that there is disagreement with regard to PD; the experts
could just be focusing on different variables. (The issue of what the experts are focus-
ing on and how this might affect the issue of combining experts’ models is discussed by
Friedenberg and Halpern [7].) In a richer model, PD might have six parents. The trouble
is, knowing the two models does not give us any insight into what the equations for PD
would be in the richer model.
Definition 4.11 (Weak domination). Let ~v∗ be a default setting for the variables in M1
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Figure 5: Schematic representation of the two prison models.
and M2. We say that M1 weakly dominates M2 with respect to a node C relative to ~v
∗,
written M1 ~v∗w,C if MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ and the following weakening of MI1M1,M2,C hold:
MI1′M1,M2,C If A is a node in both M1 and M2 then A is an immediate M1-ancestor of
C in M2 iff A is a parent of C in M1.
Note that in Example 4.2, neither M1 nor M2 weakly dominates the other with respect
to F : P is a parent of F in M2 and is not an immediate M1 ancestor of F in M1, so M1
does not weakly dominate M2 with respect to F , while P is an immediate M1 ancestor
of F in M2 and is not a parent of F in M1, so M2 does not weakly dominate M1 either.
Also note that MI1 implies MI1′; MI1′ is a strictly weaker condition than MI1, since it
allows M1 to weakly dominate M2 with respect to C if C has parents in M1 that are not
in M2 at all.
Definition 4.12. [Partial compatibility] If M1 = ((U1,V1,R1),F1) and M2 = ((U2,V2,R2),F2),
then M1 and M2 are partially compatible with respect to default setting ~v
∗ iff (1) for
all variables C ∈ (U1 ∪V1)∩ (U2 ∪V2), we have R1(C) = R2(C) and (2) for all variables
C ∈ (V1 ∩ V2) ∪ (V1 ∩ U2) ∪ (V2 ∩ U1), either M1 ~v∗w,C M2 or M2 ~v
∗
w,C M1. If M1
and M2 are partially compatible with respect to ~v
∗, then M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 = ((U ,V,R),F)
M1 ⊕M2 = ((U ,V,R),F) is defined as follows:
• U , V, R are defined just as in Definition 4.6.
• For F , if C ∈ V1−V2 then F(C) = F1(C). and if C ∈ V2−V1 then F(C) = F2(C).
If C ∈ V1 ∩ V2 and M1 ~v∗C M2, then let ~P1 consist of the parents of C in M1 and
let ~P2 consist of the parents of C in M2 that are not in M1. Then the parents of
C in M1 ⊕M2 are the nodes ~P1 ∪ ~P2. Let ~v2 consist be the values of the variables
in ~P2 when the exogenous variables in M2 have their default value in ~v
∗. Given
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an arbitrary setting ~x of the variables in ~P1, we define F(C)(~x,~v2) = F2(C)(~x).
Symmetrically, if C ∈ V2 − V1 or both C ∈ V1 ∩ V2 and M1 ~v∗w,C M2, then let
~P1 consist of the parents of C in M1 and let ~P2 consist of the parents of C in M2
that are not in M1. Then the parents of C in M1 ⊕M2 are the nodes ~P1 ∪ ~P2.
Let ~v2 consist be the values of the variables in ~P2 when the exogenous variables in
M2 have their default value in ~v
∗. Given an arbitrary setting ~x of the variables in
~P1, we define F(C)(~x,~v2) = F2(C)(~x). If C ∈ V1 ∩ V2 and M1 ~v∗w,C M2, then
let ~P1 consist of the parents of C in M1 and let ~P2 consist of the parents of C in
M2 that are not in M1. Then the parents of C in M1 ⊕M2 are the nodes ~P1 ∪ ~P2.
Let ~v2 consist be the values of the variables in ~P2 when the exogenous variables in
M2 have their default value in ~v
∗. Given an arbitrary setting ~x of the variables in
~P1, we define F(C)(~x,~v2) = F2(C)(~x). We have a symmetric definition of F(C) if
C ∈ V1 ∩ V2 and M2 ~v∗w,C M1. Again, we write M1 ⊕M2 if U1 = U2.
This definition does not define F(C) for all possible values of the parents of C. For
example, if C ∈ V1 ∩V2 and M1 ~v∗C M2, we have not defined F(C)(~x, ~y) if ~y is a setting
of the variables in ~P2 other than ~v2. Intuitively, this is because the experts have not
given us the information to determine F(C) in these cases. We can think if M1 ⊕M2
as a partial causal model. Intuitively, we cannot define |= in M1 ⊕ M2 since we will
not be able to define value of (M1 ⊕ M2, ~u) |= C = c for some setting ~u. Say that
causal model M∗ = ((U∗,V∗,R∗),F∗) extends M1 ⊕ M2 if (U∗,V∗,R∗) = (U ,V,R)
and F∗(C) = F(C) whenever F(C) is defined. We now define a 3-valued version of |=
in M1 ⊕ M2 by taking (M1 ⊕ M2, ~u) |= ϕ iff (M∗, ~u) |= ϕ for all (complete) causal
models M∗ extending M1 ⊕M2 and taking (M1 ⊕M2, ~u) |= ϕ to be undefined if neither
(M1 ⊕M2, ~u) |= ϕ nor (M1 ⊕M2, ~u) |= ¬ϕ holds.
Note that, according to the definition above, the two models in Figure 5 are partially
compatible. We can now prove a generalization of Theorem 4.8.
Theorem 4.13. Suppose that M1, M2, and M3 are pairwise partially compatible with
respect to ~v∗. Then the following conditions hold.
(a) If M1 ∼~v∗w,C M2 then (i) ParM1(C) = ParM2(C) and (ii) F1(C) = F2(C).
(b) M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 is well defined.
(c) M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 is acyclic.
(d) If A and B are variables in M1, then A is an ancestor of B in M1 iff A is an
ancestor of B in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2.
(e) If ϕ is a formula that mentions only the endogenous variables in M1, ~u is a context
for M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, ~u1 is a context for M1, and ~u and ~u1 are compatible with ~v∗, then
(M1, ~u1) |= ϕ iff (M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, ~u) |= ϕ.
(f) M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 = M2 ⊕~v∗ M1.
(g) If M3 is partially compatible with M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 and M1 is partially compatible with
M2 ⊕~v∗ M3, then M1 ⊕~v∗ (M2 ⊕~v∗ M3) = (M1 ⊕~v∗ M2)⊕~v∗ M3.
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The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 4.8, so we omit the details here.
It is easy to see that the problem of determining whether M1 and M2 are partially
compatible is of the same complexity as the problem of determining full compatibility by
the following argument. Clearly, if M1 and M2 are fully compatible, they are also partially
compatible, so the problem of determining partial compatibility is at least as hard as the
problem of determining full compatibility. On the other hand, by Definition 4.12, the
scope of compatibility is defined by the set of the common variables, hence given two
models M1 and M2, it is easy to determine the subset of variables with respect to which
we need to check compatibility. Therefore, checking partial compatibility is of the same
complexity as checking full compatibility.
4.3. Decomposition of causal models
Even with the generalised notions of compatibility introduced above, it may still be
the case that two expert’s models are not compatible. But we would expect that these
models have submodels that are compatible. Finding such submodels has several advan-
tages. First, consider the situation where the policymaker is given several different causal
models that are not fully compatible according to Definition 4.6. If we could decompose
the models, we might be able to “localize” the incompatibility, and merge the parts of the
models that are fully compatible. Doing so may suggest effective interventions. Another
advantage of decomposing a model is that it allows the policymaker to reason about each
submodel in isolation. Since the problem of computing causes is DP-complete and the
problem of computing interventions is co-NP-complete, having a smaller model to reason
about could have a significant impact on the complexity of the problem.
In order to define the notion of decomposition, we need some preliminary definitions.
Definition 4.14. [Order-preserving partition] A sequence 〈V1, . . . ,Vk〉 of subsets of
variables in V variables in a causal model M is an order-preserving partition if Vi∩Vj = ∅
for i 6= j, ∪ki=1Vi = V (so {V1, . . . ,Vk} is a partition of V), and for all i, j with i < j, no
variable in Vj is an ancestor of a variable in Vi.
Definition 4.15. [Decomposable causal models] M = ((U ,V,R),F) is decomposable if
there exist k ≥ 1 fully compatible causal models {Mi = ((Ui,Vi,Ri),Fi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k},
such that 〈V1, . . . ,Vk〉 is an order-preserving partition of V, Fi ⊆ F is the set of structural
equations that assign the values to the variables in Vi, and for each model Mi, the set Ui
consists of all the endogenous and exogenous variables in M not in Vi that participate in
the structural equations for the variables of Vi. M1, . . . ,Mk is called a decomposition of
M .
Lemma 4.16. If M1, . . . ,Mk is a decomposition of M , then M1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Mk = M .
Proof. The proof is immediate given the observation that we do not change any of the
structural equations of M when decomposing it into submodels.
It is easy to see that, for a given model, there can be many ways to decompose it into a
set of submodels according to Definition 4.15. Moreover, all models are decomposable by
Definition 4.15. Indeed, any model M can be trivially decomposed to |V| submodels, each
of which consists of exactly one endogenous variable. Of course, such a decomposition is
useless for practical purposes; the decompositions we consider are those that help in either
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analysing the model or reducing the complexity of computing causes. In Example 4.17
below, we demonstrate a nontrivial decomposition.
Example 4.17. Consider the causal models in Figure 5 from the prison example (Ex-
ample 4.10). We can decompose M1 according to Definition 4.15 into M11, M12, M13,
and M14, where Mij = ((Uij ,Vij , Rij), Fij), V11 = {FM,CG,LM,PD}, U11 consists of
all the exogenous variables in M1 (which are not explicitly given in Figure 5) that are an-
cestors of the variables in V11, V12 = {SC,CM,CB, IL}, U12 consists of all the exogenous
variables in M1 that are ancestors of the variables in V12 together FM, V13 = {AS,AM},
U13 consists of all the exogenous variables in M1 that are ancestors of the variables in
V13 together IL, V14 = {R}, and U14 = {PD,CB,AM}. Similarly we can decompose
M2 into four submodels M21, M22, M23, where M24, where Mij = ((Uij ,Vij ,Rij),Fij),
V21 = {C,W,AA,D,RG,PD}, U21 consists of all the exogenous variables in M2 that
are ancestors of the variables in V21. V22 = {CM,CB}, U22 consists of all the exogenous
variables in M2 that are ancestors of the variables in V22, V23 = {AS,AM}, U23 consists
of all the exogenous variables in M2 that are ancestors of the variables in V23, V24 = {R},
and U24 = {PD,CB,AM}. Figures 6 and Figures 7 show the four submodels resulting
from these decompositions. There is some flexibility in how we do the decomposition. For
example, we could move IL from V12 and U13 to V13 and U12. However, we cannot, for
example, move CB into Vi1, for then 〈Vi1,Vi2,Vi3,Vi4〉 would not be an order-preserving
partition (since FM is an ancestor of CM, which is an ancestor of CB).
FM
CG LM
PD
M11
SC
CM IL
FM
CB
M12
AS
IL
AM
M13
AM
R
M14
PD
CB
Figure 6: Decomposition of the model M1 from Example 4.10.
We observe that decomposing incompatible models into smaller submodels can in
some cases help determine common interventions over shared outcomes in the original
models in spite of their incompatibility. Consider, for example, the two incompatible
modelsM1 andM2 in the prison example. Although the two are incompatible (as observed
in Example 4.10), the submodels M12 and M22 in Figures 6 and 7, respectively, obtained
from their decomposition, are fully compatible according to Definition 4.6. We have
M12 ~v∗CB M22 and M12 ~v
∗
CM M22. The composition of the two submodels yields a
merged model similar to M12. Given this, it may be concluded that interventions over
SC or IL make it possible to change the value of CB in the two models M1 and M2
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Figure 7: Decomposition of the model M2 from Example 4.10.
and ultimately R (assuming the structural equation for R in both models M1 and M2
to be the conjunction of PD, CB and AM)—a similar conclusion reached by considering
partial compatibility between the models M1 and M2 in Section 4.2. We conjecture that
reasoning using model decomposition and full compatibility of submodels is an alternative
to reasoning using partial compatibility.
Another advantage of decomposing a causal model M into a set of smaller submodels
is that we can reason about each submodel separately. In particular, we can compute the
set of causes and possible interventions for a given outcome. However, in order to use
these results to reason about the whole model, we need to perform additional calculations.
Informally, when decomposing M into a set of smaller submodels, we can view each
submodel as a black box, with inputs and outputs being the exogenous variables of
the submodel and the leaves in the causal graph of the submodel, respectively. We can
then put connect these variables into an abstract causal graph for the original model,
essentially ignoring the internal variables. If the submodels are fairly large, the graph
of submodels will be significantly smaller than the causal network of M . We can then
apply causal reasoning to the abstract graph, which will result in a set of submodels
being causes for the outcome. For these submodels, we can calculate the causes of their
outcomes for each submodel separately. As causality is DP -complete, and computing
interventions is co-NP -complete, solving a set of smaller problems instead of a large
problem is cheaper.
We note that, in fact, interesting decompositions (that is, decompositions of a large
model into a set of submodels of a reasonable size with relatively few interconnections
between them, which means that we can analyse causality both within a submodel and
between submodels relatively easily) are possible only in models that are somewhat
loosely connected. Such a decomposition can often be done for real-life cases; see Exam-
ple 4.18. We believe that, in practice, analyzing the effect of interventions in a model will
be difficult precisely when a model is highly connected, so that there are many causal
paths. We expect the causal models that arise in practice to be much more loosely con-
nected, and thus amenable to useful decompositions. Hence, the computation of causes
and interventions in practice should not be as bad as what is suggested by our worst-case
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analysis.
Below, we briefly discuss the relevant aspects of two cases of child abuse that resulted
in the death of a child: the “Baby P” case and the Victoria Climbie` case. In these cases,
experts’ opinions were in fact only partially compatible, and there were natural ways to
decompose the causal model.
Example 4.18 (The cases of Baby P and Victoria Climbie`). Baby P (Peter Connelly)
died in 2007 after suffering physical abuse over an extended period of time [21]. The
court ultimately found the three adults living in a home with baby Peter guilty of “caus-
ing or allowing [Peter’s] death” [25]. After baby Peter’s death, there was an extensive
inquiry into practices, training, and governance in each of the involved professionals and
organizations separately. 6
As shown by Chockler et al. [2], the complete causal model for the Baby P case is
complex, involving many variables and interactions between them. There were several
authorities involved in the legal proceedings, specifically social services, the police, the
medical system, and the court. In addition, the legal proceedings considered the family
situation of Baby P. Roughly speaking, the causal model can be viewed as having the
schematic breakdown presented in Figure 8.
services
Baby P’s death
CourtPoliceSocial services
Medical
system
Family
situation
Figure 8: Schematic representation of causal submodels in the Baby P case.
Each of the experts involved in the legal inquest and enquiry had expertise that cor-
responded to one of the boxes in Figure 8 (i.e., there were no experts with expertise that
covered more than one box). The figure suggests that we might divide the causal model
into submodels corresponding to each box. The schematic representation in Figure 8 does
not take into account the interaction between submodels. In reality, there were numerous
interactions between, for example, the social services and the court submodels, leading to
court hearings, which in turn determined the course of action taken by the social services
and the police after the court decision. Once we model these interactions more carefully,
we need a somewhat more refined decomposition.
We give a decomposition in Figure 9 that takes into account the interactions for part
of the case, namely, the part that concerns the social services, the court, the police, and
family life. To make the decomposition consistent with Definition 4.15, we break up social
services into two submodels, for reasons explained below.
The variables in the figure are: FV for whether there was a family visit from the social
services; PR for whether there was a police report; CH for whether there was a court
6Chockler et al. [2] provide a more detailed discussion of the case of “Baby P”, including a construction
of the causal model.
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Family
PRFV
SocialServices #1
SocialServices #2
Figure 9: Simplified causal model M of a part of the Baby P case.
hearing; RFH for whether the child was removed from home; CP for whether the child
was put on the Child Protection Register; SR for whether there was a social services
report; CS for whether the child was declared safe in the family home; MA, PA, and
OA for whether the child was abused by his mother, the mother’s partner, or another
adult in the house, respectively; CA for whether the child was abused; and, finally, D
for whether the final outcome was death (of Baby P) due to abuse. Note that, as usual,
we have omitted exogenous variables of the full model in the figure; it shows only the
endogenous variables. Thus, we do not have the exogenous variables that determine FV,
PR, MA, PA or OA. The dotted rectangles in Figure 9 determine a decomposition. Each
rectangle consists of the endogenous variables of one submodel. The exogenous variables
of the SocialServices#2 and Outcome submodels are those parent variables appearing
in the other submodels. Thus, for example, in the Outcome submodel, the exogenous
variables are CS , RFH , and CA. The submodels are described in Figure 10. The dotted
rectangles in Figure 9 can be viewed as compact representations of the submodels in
Figure 10.
Of course, there is more than one way to decompose the model of Figure 9. For
example, the submodel currently standing for the court and the police can be decomposed
into two smaller submodels, one for the court and one for the police. However, it is critical
that we have decomposed social services into two submodels. The variable CH depends
on FV, and the variable CP in turn depends on CH, hence FV and CP cannot be in
the same submodel (or else we would violate the requirement of Definition 4.15 that the
sets of endogenous variables of each submodel form an order-preserving partition of the
endogenous variables of the original model).
We consider another case of child abuse that resulted in child’s death: Victoria
Climbie` [21]. Victoria died in her house from hypothermia, 18 months after arriving
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Figure 10: One possible decomposition of the Baby P model M .
in the UK from the Ivory Coast to live with her great-aunt. Her great-aunt and the
great-aunt’s boyfriend were found guilty of Victoria’s murder (in contrast with the Baby
P case, where the adults in the house were found guilty of causing or allowing his death).
The inquiry into the circumstances of Victoria’s death placed the blame on social
workers, who failed to notice Victoria’s injuries, paediatricians, who accepted the ex-
planation of Victoria’s great-aunt that Victoria’s injuries were self-inflicted, and the
metropolitan police. In addition, the inquiry noted that the pastors in the church to
which Victoria’s great-aunt belonged, had concerns about the child’s well-being but failed
to contact any child protection services. The inquiry suggested several interventions on
the procedures of social workers and paediatricians. These interventions turned out to
be inadequate, as the death of Baby P occurred under somewhat similar circumstances
and his abuse also went unnoticed until his death.
Although there were some similarities between the Baby P case and the Victoria
Clibmbi’e cases, there were also some differences. For example, while Vicitoria Climbiee´
died at home, Baby P died in the hospital. Thus, the causal models for these two cases
differ somewhat. However, the causal model for the Victoria Climbie´ case is also decom-
posable into fully compatible submodels in the sense of Section 4.3. Moreover, some of
the submodels in the decomposition are identical to those in the causal model for Baby
P. Specifically, there are submodels for the police, the medical system, the family system,
and the courts, just as in the case of Baby P, as well as a submodel for the church. The
schematic breakdown is presented in Figure 11. Although we do not provide the causal
model in detail here, this discussion already illustrates a major advantage of decomposi-
tion: it allows us to reuse causal models that were developed in one case and apply them
to another, thus saving a lot of effort. Moreover, if the same submodel appears in several
different cases, such as the social services submodel in these examples, this suggests that
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Family
situation
Social services Police Medical care Church
Figure 11: Schematic representation of causal submodels in the Victoria Climbie`’s case.
the policymaker should prefer interventions that address the problems demonstrated by
this submodel, as they are likely to affect several cases. In fact, the cases of child abuse
that remains undetected due to problems in the social services sadly continue to occur
(see, for example, the recently published cases discussed in [17]). Even though the causal
models for different cases will undoubtedly be different, we can still take advantage of
the common submodels. We expect that this will be the case in many other situations as
well.
From a practical perspective, Example 4.18 demonstrates one benefit of decomposi-
tion: the decomposition allows us to capture different aspects of the case, each requiring
different expertise. This facilitates different experts working on each of the submodels
independently. The process also works in the other direction: a policymaker often has a
crude idea of the general structure of the causal model, and what components are in-
volved in the decision-making process. She can then decompose her initial causal model
into submodels and, guided by these submodels, decide which areas of expertise are
critical.
A further benefit of decomposition illustrated by these examples is that, although
different, the causal models had some common submodels. Thus, decomposition supports
a form of modularity in the analysis, and enables results of earlier analyses to be reused.
5. Combining Experts’ Opinions
In this section, we show how we can combine experts’ causal options. Suppose that we
have a collection of pairs (M1, p1), . . . , (Mn, pn), with pi ∈ (0, 1]; we can think of Mi as
the model that expert i thinks is the right one and pi as the policymaker’s prior degree of
confidence that expert i is correct. (The reason we say “prior” here will be clear shortly.)
Our goal is to combine the expert’ models. We present one way of doing so, that uses
relatively standard techniques. The idea is to treat the probabilities p1, . . . , pn as mutually
independent. Thus, if I is a subset of {1, . . . , n}, the prior probability that exactly the
experts in I are right, which we denote pI , is pI =
∏
i∈I(pi) ∗
∏
j 6∈I(1 − pj). Now we
have some information regarding whether all the experts in I are right. Specifically, if
the models in {Mi : i ∈ I} are not mutually compatible, then it is impossible that all the
experts in I are right. Intuitively, we want to condition on this information. We proceed
as follows.
Fix a default setting ~v∗ of the exogneous variables that are not common toM1, . . . ,Mn
Let Compat~v
∗
= {I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} : the models in {Mi : i ∈ I} are mutually compatible
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Figure 12: Third expert’s (and merged) model of famine.
with respect to ~v∗}. For I ∈ Compat~v∗ , define MI = ⊕~v∗i∈IMi. By Proposition 4.8, MI
is well defined. The models in MCompat~v∗ = {MI : I ∈ Compat~v
∗} are the candidate
merged models that the policymaker should consider. MI is the “right” model provided
that exactly the experts in I are right. But even if MI ∈ MCompat~v∗ , it may not be
the “right” model, since it may be the case that not all the expert in I are right. The
probability that the policymaker should give MI is pI/N , where N =
∑
I∈Compat~v∗ pI is
a normalization factor.
This approach gives the policymaker a distribution over causal models. This can be
used to compute, for each context, which interventions affect the outcome ϕ of interest,
and then compute the probability that a particular intervention is effective (which can be
done summing the probability of the models MI inMCompat~v∗ where it is effective, which
in turn can be computed as described in Section 3). Note that our calculation implicitly
conditions on the fact that at least one expert is right, but allows for the possibility that
only some subset of the experts in I is right even if I ∈ Compat~v∗ ; we place positive
probability on MI′ even if I
′ is a strict subset of some I ∈ Compat~v∗ . This method of
combining experts’ judgments is similar in spirit to the method proposed by Dawid [5]
and Fenton et al. [6].
To get a sense of how this works, consider a variant of Example 4.2, in which a third
expert provides her view on causes on famine and thinks that government corruption
is an indirect cause via its effect on political conflict (see Figure 12); call this model
M3. For simplicity, we assume that all models have the same set of exogenous variables.
According to the compatibility definition in Section 4, the models M2 and M3 are fully
compatible (assuming that MI3 holds), but M1 and M3 are not. We have MCompat =
{{M1}, {M2}, {M3}, {M2,3}} with M2,3 = M2 ⊕M3 = M3. Suppose that experts are
assigned the confidence values as follows: (M1, 0.4), (M2, 0.6) and (M3, 0.5) respectively.
Then the probability on M2,3 is the probability of M2 and M3 being right (i.e., 0.6 ∗ 0.5)
and M1 being wrong (i.e., 1− 0.4 = 0.6). So we have
p1 = 0.4 ∗ 0.4 ∗ 0.5/0.56 = 0.14
p2 = 0.6 ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.5/0.56 = 0.32
p3 = 0.6 ∗ 0.4 ∗ 0.5/0.56 = 0.21
p2,3 = 0.6 ∗ 0.5 ∗ 0.6/0.56 = 0.32
where 0.08 + 0.18 + 0.12 + 0.18 = 0.56 is the normalization factor N .
Let us consider the Sampson’s domestic violence models as another point of illustra-
tion. The model shown in Figure 4 is the result of merging the two fully compatible models
given in Figure 3. We thus haveMCompat = {{M1}, {M2}, {M1,2}} with M1,2 = M1⊕M2
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as given in Figure 4. Assuming that expert 1 is assigned a confidence value 0.6 and expert
2 is assigned 0.7, then we have
p1 = 0.6 ∗ 0.3 ∗ 0.58/0.44 = 0.23
p2 = 0.4 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 0.58/0.44 = 0.36
p1,2 = 0.6 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 0.42/0.44 = 0.41
Note that the number of models in MCompat may be exponential in the number
of experts. For example, if the experts’ models are mutually compatible, then Compat
consists of all subsets of {1, . . . , n}. The straightforward computation of interventions
per model is exponential in the number of variables in the model. Since the number of
variables in a merged model is at most the sum of the variables in each one, the problem
is exponential in the number of experts and the total number of variables in the experts’
models. In practice, however, we do not expect this to pose a problem. For the problems
we are interested in, there are typically few experts involved; moreover, as we argued in
Section 3, policymakers, in practice, restrict their attention to interventions on a small
set of variables. Thus, we expect that the computation involved to be manageable.
Up to now, we have assumed that each expert proposes only one deterministic causal
model. An expert uncertain about the model can propose several (typically incompatible)
models, with a probability distribution on them. We can easily extend our framework to
handle this.
Suppose that expert i, with probability pi of being correct, proposes m models
Mi1, . . . ,Mim, where model Mij has probability qj of being the right one, according
to i. To handle this, we simply replace expert i by m experts, i1, . . . , im, where expert
ij proposes model Mij with probability piqj of being correct. As long as each of a few
experts has a probability on only a few models, this will continue to be tractable.
6. Conclusions
We have provided a method for combining causal models whenever possible, and
used that as a basis for combining experts’ causal judgments in a way that gets around
the impossibility result of Bradley et al. [1]. We provided a gradual weakening of our
definition of full compatibility, allowing us to merge models that only agree on some of
their parts. Our approach can be viewed as a formalization of what was done informally in
earlier work [2, 24]. While our requirements for compatibility are certainly nontrivial, the
examples that we have considered do suggest that our approach is quite applicable. That
said, it would be interesting to consider alternative approaches to combining experts’
models. The approach considered by Friedenberg and Halpern [7] is one such approach;
there may well be others.
In any case, we believe that using causal models as a way of formalizing experts’
judgments, and then providing a technique for combining these judgments, will prove to
be a powerful tool with which to approach the problem of finding the best intervention(s)
that can be performed to ameliorate a situation.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 4.8
Proof. For part (a), suppose that M1 ∼~v∗C M2 and, by way of contradiction, that
ParM1(C) 6= ParM2(C). We can assume without loss of generality that there is some
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variable Y ∈ ParM1(C)− ParM2(C). Let ~Z = ParM1(C)− {Y }. Since Y is a parent of
C in M1, there must be some setting ~z of the variables in ~Z and values y and y
′ for Y
such that F 1C(y, ~z) 6= F 1C(y′, ~z) in M1, where F 1C = F1(C). Suppose that F 1C(y, ~z) = c and
F 1C(y
′, ~z) = c′. Let ~X = ((U1 ∪ V1) ∩ (U2 ∪ V2)). By MI1, (ParM1(C) ∪ ParM2(C)) ⊆ ~X.
Let ~x be a setting of the variables in ~X −{C} such that ~x agrees with ~z for the variables
in ~Z and ~x assigns y to Y . Let ~x′ be identical to ~x except that it assigns y′ to Y . Since
the values of the variables in ParM1(C) determine the value of C in M1, for all contexts
~u1 for M1, we have (M1, ~u1) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c) and (M1, ~u1) |= [ ~X ← ~x′](C = c′).
Since ~x and ~x′ assign the same values to all the variables in Par2(C), we must have
(M2, ~u2) |= [ ~X ← ~x](C = c) iff (M2, ~u2) |= [ ~X ← ~x′](C = c) for all contexts ~u2 for M2.
Thus, we get a contradiction to MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ . It follows that ParM1(C) = ParM2(C).
The fact that F1(C) = F2(C) also follows from MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗ . For suppose that ~z is
a setting of the variables in Par1(C) = Par2(C) and ~x is a setting of the variables in
~X ′ = ~X − {C} that agrees with ~z on the variables in Par1(C). Then, for all contexts
~u1 for M1 and ~u2 for M2 such that ~u1 and ~u2 agree on the variables in U1 ∩ U2, we
have F 1C(~z) = c iff (M1, ~u1) |= [ ~X ′ ← ~x](C = c) iff (M2, ~u2) |= [ ~X ′ ← ~x](C = c) (by
MI4M1,M2,C,~v∗) iff F
2
C(~z) = c. Thus, F1(C) = F2(C).
For part (b), note that M1⊕~v∗M2 is well defined unless (i) R1(C) 6= R2(C) for some
C ∈ ((U1 ∪V1)∩ (U2 ∪V2)) or (ii) M1 ∼~v∗C M2 but F1(C) 6= F2(C) for some C ∈ V1 ∩V2.
Since M1 and M2 are fully compatible with respect to ~v
∗, (i) cannot happen; by part
(a), (ii) cannot happen.
For part (c), we first show part (d): if A and B are both nodes in M1 (i.e., A and B
are in U1 ∪ V1), then (the node labeled) A is an ancestor of (the node labeled) B in (the
causal graph corresponding to) M1 iff A is an ancestor of B in M1⊕~v∗M2, and similarly
for M2.
Suppose that A is an ancestor of B in M1, Then there is a finite path A0, . . . , An in
the causal graph for M1, where A0 = A and An = B. We first show that if A0, . . . , An
is an arbitrary sequence of nodes in M1 such that none of the intermediate nodes (i.e.,
A1, . . . , An−1) are in M2, and either A0 = An or at most one of A0 and An is in M2,
then A0, . . . , An is a path in M1 iff A0, . . . , An is a path in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. We proceed by
induction on n, the length of the path. Since all the nodes in M1 are nodes in M1⊕~v∗M2,
the result clearly holds if n = 0. Suppose that n > 0 and the result holds for n − 1; we
prove it for n. We cannot have An ∈ U1 − V2, since then An has no parents in M1 or
M1⊕~v∗M2. If An ∈ V1−V2 or An ∈ V1 ∩V2 and M1 ~v∗An M2, then F1,2(An) = F1(An),
so the parents of An in M1 are also the parents of An in M1⊕~v∗M2. In particular, An−1
is a parent of An in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 iff An−1 is a parent of An in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, and the result
follows from the induction hypothesis. Finally, if An ∈ (U ∪ V1) ∩ V2 and M2 ~v∗An M1,
then F1,2(An) = F2(An), so An−1 must be in M2. But this contradicts our assumption,
that no intermediate nodes are in M2 and at most one of A0 and An is in M2. This
completes the argument. Note that the same argument applies if we reverse the roles of
M1 and M2.
Now suppose that there are m > 0 nodes in M2 on the path from A to B in M1, say
C1, . . . , Cm, in that order. We show that (i) Cm is an ancestor of B in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, (ii)
A is an ancestor of C1 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, and (iii) C1 is an ancestor of Cm in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2.
Parts (i) and (ii) follow from the earlier argument, since there are no intermediate nodes
in M2 on the path from Cm to B or on the path from A to C1. So it remains to prove
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part (iii). We proceed by induction on m. If m = 1, the result is trivially true, since C1
is a node in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. So suppose that m > 1. Since M1 and M2 are fully compatible
with respect to ~v∗ and C2 is a node in both M1 and M2 for j > 1, we must have either
M1 ~v∗C2 M2 or M2 ~v
∗
C2
M1. If M1 ~v∗C2 M2 then the parents of C2 in M1 are the parents
of C2 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. In particular, if D is the parent of C2 on the path from C1 to C2
in M1, then D is a parent of C2 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. Since none of the intermediate nodes on
the path from C1 to D in M1 are in M2 except for C1, it follows by our earlier argument
than the path from C1 to D in M1 is also a path from C1 to D in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. Thus, C1
is an ancestor of C2 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. If M2 ~v∗C2 M1, then the parents of C2 in M1 must
also be in M2 (in fact, they must be M1-immediate ancestors of C2 in M2). Since none
of the intermediate nodes on the path from C1 to C2 is in M2, it must be the case that
the path from C1 to C2 has length 1, and C1 is a parent of C2 in M1. By MI1M2,M1,C2 ,
there is a path from C1 to C2 in M2 none of whose intermediate nodes is in M1. Then
the same argument given for the case that M1 ~v∗C2 M2 shows that this path in M2 also
exists in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. Thus, C1 is an ancestor of C2 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 in this case as well.
The fact that C2 is ancestor of Cm in M1 ⊕~v∗M2 follows from the induction hypothesis.
Thus, C1 is an ancestor of Cm in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2.
For the converse, suppose that A and B are nodes in M1 and A is an ancestor of B in
M1⊕~v∗M2. We want to show that A is an ancestor of B in M1. The argument is similar
to that above, but slightly simpler. Again, there is a finite path A0, . . . , An in the causal
graph for M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, where A0 = A and An = B. If none of the intermediate nodes on
the path are in M2 and at most one of A0 and An is in M2, then our initial argument
shows that this path also exists in M1.
Now suppose that there are m > 0 nodes in M2 on the path from A to B in M1⊕~v∗M2,
say C1, . . . , Cm, in that order. Much like before, we show that (i) Cm is an ancestor of
B in M1, (ii) A is an ancestor of C1 in M1, and (iii) C1 is an ancestor of Cm in M1. And
again, parts (i) and (ii) follow from the earlier argument, since there are no intermediate
nodes in M2 on the path from Cm to B or the path from A to C1. For part (iii), we again
proceed by induction on m. If m = 1, the result is trivially true. So suppose that m > 1.
Since M1 and M2 are fully compatible with respect to ~v
∗ and C2 is a node in both M1
and M2 for j > 1, we must have either M1 ~v∗C2 M2 or M2 ~v
∗
C2
M1. If M1 ~v∗C2 M2, then
the parents of C2 in M1 are just the parents of C2 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, so if D is the parent
of C2 on the path from C1 to C2 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, D is a parent of C2 in M1. Since the
path from C1 to D in M1⊕~v∗M2 has no intermediate nodes in M2, we can apply earlier
argument to show that there is a path from C1 to D in M1, and complete the proof as
before. If M2 ~v∗C2 M1, then all the parents of C2 in M1 ⊕~v
∗
M2 must be in M2, so the
path has length 1 and C1 is a parent of C2 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 and in M2. Thus, C1 is an
immediate M1-ancestor of C2 in M2. MI1M2,M1,C2 implies that C1 must be a parent of
C2 in M1. Again, we can complete the proof as before.
The acyclicity of M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 is now almost immediate. For suppose that there is
a cycle A0, . . . , An in the causal graph for M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, where A0 = An and n > 0.
Either An and An−1 are both in M1 (if F1,2(An) = F1(An)) or they are both in M2
(if F1,2(An) = F2(An)). Suppose that they are both in M1. Then, since An−1 is an
ancestor of An in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 and An is an ancestor of An−1 in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, by the
preceding argument, An−1 is an ancestor of An in M1 and An is an ancestor of An−1 in
M1, contradicting the acyclicity of M1. A similar argument applies if both An−1 and An
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are in M2.
For part (e), suppose that ~u1 and ~u2 are compatible with ~v
∗. It clearly suffices to
show that (M1, ~u1) |= ϕ iff (M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, ~u) |= ϕ if ϕ has the form [ ~X ← ~x](Y = y),
where ( ~X ∪ {Y }) ⊆ V1. To show this, it suffices to show that ((M1) ~X=~x, ~u1) |= (Y = y)
iff ((M1 ⊕~v∗ M2) ~X=~x, ~u) |= (Y = y). Define the depth of a variable Y in a causal graph
to be the length of the longest path from an exogenous variable to Y in the graph. We
prove, by induction on the depth of the variable Y in the causal graph of M1 ⊕~v∗ M2,
that for all contexts ~u1 in M1, ~u2 in M2, and ~u in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2, (i) if Y ∈ U1 ∪ V1,
~X ⊆ V1, and ~u and ~u1 are compatible with ~v∗, then ((M1) ~X=~x, ~u1) |= (Y = y) iff
((M1 ⊕~v∗ M2) ~X=~x, ~u) |= (Y = y), and (ii) if Y ∈ U2 ∪ V2, ~X ⊆ V2, ~u and ~u2 are
compatible with ~v∗, then ((M2) ~X=~x, ~u2) |= (Y = y) iff ((M1 ⊕~v
∗
M2) ~X=~x, ~u) |= (Y = y).
(Note that if Y ∈ (U1 ∪ V1) ∩ (U2 ∪ V2), then it must satisfy both (i) and (ii).)
If Y has depth 0, then Y is an exogenous variable, and the result is immediate. Suppose
that Y has depth d > 0. If Y ∈ V1 − (U2 ∪ V2), then the parents of Y in M1 ⊕~v∗ M2 are
the same as the parents of Y in M1; (i) is then immediate from the induction hypothesis
and (ii) is vacuously true. Similarly, if Y ∈ V2 − (U1 ∪ V1), then (ii) is immediate from
the induction hypothesis and (i) is vacuously true. If Y ∈ (U1 ∪ V1) ∩ (U2 ∪ V2) and
M1 ~v∗Y M2, then again, the parents of Y in M1 ⊕~v
∗
M2 are the same as the parents
of Y in M1, so (i) is immediate from the induction hypothesis. To show that (ii) holds,
fix appropriate contexts ~u2 and ~u. Now the parents of Y in M2 are the immediate M2-
ancestors of Y in M1. Let ~Z = ParM2(Y ). It follows from the arguments for part (c)
that for all Z ∈ ParM2(Y ), all the paths from Z to Y in M1 also exist in M1 ⊕~v
∗
M2
and the parents of Y in M2 are exactly the immediate M2-ancestors of Y in M1⊕~v∗M2.
That is, ~Z screens Y from all other variables in M2 not only in M2, but also in M1
and M1 ⊕~v∗ M2. Suppose that ((M2) ~X←x, ~u2) |= ~Z = ~z. It follows from the induction
hypothesis that ((M1 ⊕~v∗ M2) ~X=~x, ~u) |= ~Z = ~z. Let ~W = ((U1 ∪ V1) ∩ (U2 ∪ V2))− {Y }.
Let ~w be a setting for ~W that agrees with ~z on the variables in ~Z. Then we have the
following chain of equivalences:
((M2) ~X=~x, ~u) |= Y = y
iff ((M2) ~X=~x, ~u2) |= [~Z ← ~z](Y = y)
iff ((M2) ~X=~x, ~u2) |= [ ~W ← ~w](Y = y)
iff (M2, ~u2) |= [ ~W ← ~w](Y = y)
iff (M1, ~u1) |= [ ~W ← ~w](Y = y) [by MI4M1,M2,Y,~v∗ ]
iff (M1, ~u1) |= [~Z ← ~z](Y = y)
iff ((M1)~Z=~z, ~u1) |= (Y = y)
iff ((M1 ⊕~v∗ M2)~Z=~z, ~u1) |= (Y = y) [already shown]
iff ((M1 ⊕~v∗ M2), ~u1) |= [~Z ← ~z](Y = y)
iff ((M1 ⊕~v∗ M2) ~X=~x, ~u1) |= [~Z ← ~z](Y = y)
iff ((M1 ⊕~v∗ M2) ~X=~x, ~u1) |= Y = y
[since (M1 ⊕~v∗ M2) ~X=~x, ~u1) |= ~Z = ~z]
This completes the proof of (d).
Part (f) is immediate from the definitions.
For part (g), suppose that M1 = ((U1,V1,R1),F1), M2 = ((U2,V2,R2),F2), M3 =
((U3,V3,R3),F3),M1⊕~v∗M2 = ((U1,2,V1,2,R1,2),F1,2),M2⊕~v∗M3 = ((U2,3,V2,3,R2,3),F2,3),
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M1 ⊕~v∗ (M2 ⊕~v∗ M3) = ((U1,2,3,V1,2,3,R1,2,3),F1,2,3), and (M1 ⊕~v∗ M2) ⊕~v∗ M3 =
((U ′1,2,3,V ′1,2,3,R′1,2,3),F ′1,2,3). We want to show that M1 ⊕~v
∗
(M2 ⊕~v∗ M3) = (M1 ⊕~v∗
M2) ⊕~v∗ M3. It is almost immediate from the definitions that U1,2,3 = U ′1,2,3, V1,2,3 =
V ′1,2,3, and R1,2,3 = R′1,2,3. To show that F1,2,3 = F ′1,2,3, we show that for all vari-
ables C ∈ V1,2,3, F1,2,3(C) = F ′1,2,3(C). We proceed by cases. First suppose that C is
in exactly one of the models. Say, for example, C is in M1 but not M2 or M3 (i.e.,
C = (U1 ∪ V1) − (U2 ∪ V2 ∪ U3 ∪ V3). If C ∈ U1, there is nothing further to prove. If
C ∈ V1, then it is easy to check that F1,2,3(C) = F ′1,2,3 = F1(C). The same argument
works if C is just in M2 or just in M3.
If C is in two of the three models, suppose without loss of generality that C is in M1
and M2 but not M3. Since M1 and M2 are fully compatible with respect to ~v
∗, either
M1 ~v∗C M2 or M2 ~v
∗
C M1 (or both). If M1 ~v
∗
C M2, then either C ∈ U1 ∈ U2, in which
case there is nothing further to prove, or C ∈ V1. In that case, F1,2(C) = F1(C), so
F1,2,3(C) = F1(C). Since C /∈ V3, we have F2,3(C) = F2(C). If we also have M2 ~v∗C M1,
then by (a), F1(C) = F2(C), and it is easy to see that F ′1,2,3(C) = F1(C). Now suppose
that M2 6~v∗C M1. M1 is fully compatible with M2 ⊕~v
∗
M3 with respect to ~v
∗, we must
have either M1 ~v∗C M2 ⊕~v
∗
M3 or M2 ⊕~v∗ M3 ~v∗C M1. It is easy to see that since
M2 6~v∗C M1, we cannot have M2 ⊕~v
∗
M3 ~v∗C M1, so we must have M1 ~v
∗
C M2 ⊕~v
∗
M3.
It follows that F ′1,2,3(C) = F1(C).
Finally, suppose that C is in all three models. We first show that ~v∗C is transitive
when restricted to M1, M2, and M3. For suppose that M1 ~v∗C M2 and M2 ~v
∗
C M3. If
M1 ∼~v∗C M2 or M2 ∼~v
∗
C M3, then it is easy to see that M1 ~v
∗
C M3. So suppose that
M1 ~v∗C M2 and M2 ~v
∗
C M3. Since M1 and M3 are fully compatible with respect to
~v∗, we must have either M1 ~v∗C M3 or M3 ~v
∗
C M1. Suppose by way of contradiction
that M3 ~v∗C M1. Let ~X1 = ParM1(C), ~X2 = ParM2(C), and ~X3 = ParM3(C). We
now construct an infinite sequence of variables A0, A1, . . . such that each variable in the
sequence is either in ~X2 − ~X1, ~X3 − ~X2, or ~X1 − ~X3, and if variable An is in ~Xi − ~Xj ,
then the next variable is in ~Xj and there is a path in Mj from An to An+1. We proceed
by induction. Since M1 ~v∗C M2, by MI1M1,M2,C there must be at least one variable in
A0 ∈ ~X2 − ~X1 and a path from Z1 to C in M1 that does not go through any other
variables in ~X2. Since ~X1 screens C from all ancestors in M1, this path must go through
a variable A1 ∈ ~X1− ~X2. If A1 ∈ ~X3, then it is in ~X3− ~X2; if A1 /∈ ~X3, it is in ~X1− ~X3.
Either way, A1 is an appropriate successor of A0 in the sequence. The inductive step of
the argument is identical; if An ∈ ~Xi− ~Xj , we use the fact that Mj ~v∗C Mi to construct
An+1. Note that, for all n ≥ 0, since An ∈ ~Xi − ~Xj and An+1 ∈ ~Xj , we must have
An 6= An+1. Moreover, by the argument in the proof of (c) since there is a path from
An to An+1 in Mj , there must also be such a path in M1 ⊕~v∗ (M2 ⊕~v∗ M3). Since there
are only finitely many variables altogether, there must be some N1 and N2 such that
AN1 = AN2 . That means we have a cycle in M1 ⊕~v
∗
(M2 ⊕~v∗ M3), contradicting (c).
Since ~v∗C is transitive and complete on {M1,M2,M3} (completeness says that for
each pair, one of the two must be dominant), one of M1, M2, and M3 must dominate the
other two with respect to ~v∗C . Suppose it is M1. It is easy to see that M1⊕~v
∗
M2 ~v∗C M3
and M1 ~v∗C (M2 ⊕~v
∗
M3). It then easily follows that F1,2,3(C) = F ′1,2,3(C) = F1(C). A
similar argument holds if M2 or M3 is the model that dominates with respect to ~v∗C .
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